A Legal Rite

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One of the main functions of legal systems is to provide remedies for violations (or sometimes expected violations) of the primary rights conferred on them. Thus, if someone is injured by the negligence of another, a claim for compensation usually arises. If he is killed, his family members may have an independent right to compensation, and so on. Other types of remedies may include those for court orders that require the offender to execute or refrain from taking a particular course of action, very often the one to which he was or was obliged under primary law to refrain from doing so. These rights are often very complex in detail. For example, the amount of damages may vary if the illegal act is a misdemeanor, as opposed to a breach of contract. Similarly, in many systems, some remedies must be granted by law, while others are at the discretion of the court. To illustrate the remedies available in both British legal systems, reference may be made to Lawson (1980) and Walker (1974). However, some of these legal systems are often and more correctly called hybrid in nature: rights of redress are those that arise from a violation of a primary right.

Of course, they also arise from outside the law, for example, an obligation to apologize or make amends, even if there is no legal obligation to do so. But legal remedies are generally more precise and, precisely because of the nature of the law, institutionalized. Lat. Appropriate and formal; legally; correct; technique. In most modern legal systems, certain fundamental rights are conferred by the Constitution. This usually gives them some priority over competing legal considerations, but it can vary from system to system. Sometimes constitutional rights take absolute precedence over any other consideration that is not based on a constitutional right. Sometimes they will only prefer one legal outcome and not another without dictating it. However, there is no legal right to a bequest under a will. Legatees under the will can only claim as fair owners, not as legal owners.

Their rights are all just and can only be exercised in the manner established by law or in accordance with fair rules. [In Folwell`s estate, 68 N.J. Eq. 728, 732 (N.J. 1905)]. The first question is whether property rights, and thus the concept of property, are essentially of a legal nature, or whether they are more general social phenomena that are simply recognized and protected by law in all modern societies. According to Bentham (1843). there is no natural property.

Property is entirely the creature of the law. Bentham`s argument is essentially that what we mean by ownership is the security of waiting to keep, sell, use, etc., and only the law can guarantee such security. The presentation of the above rights has been largely written from the point of view of Anglo-American law and philosophy. However, it is worth mentioning that there is an aspect of legal rights that can be found among European continental writers, but of which there is no trace in the Anglo-American tradition. It is the description of rights as “subjective” (subjective rights; subjective rights). A related, more controversial point is whether criminal law, unlike civil law, confers legal rights on the citizens it protects. The Orthodox view is that this is not the case, although there may be a parallel civil law. Let us take the case of someone who is unfairly attacked. In most legal systems, this will be both a crime and a misdemeanour. Civil law clearly grants a remedy, for example to bring an action for damages. However, since in most jurisdictions it is mainly (and sometimes exclusively) the State that decides whether or not to prosecute the criminal aspect, the most common opinion is that the citizen does not have a right that corresponds to the criminal aspect. Comparative law scholars and economists who promote the theory of legal origins generally divide civil law into four distinct groups: the details of property rights vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, perhaps more than those of almost all other types of rights.

In addition, many jurisdictions have different rules regarding the ownership of land (and its facilities) compared to all other types of businesses. For these details, it is advisable to refer in the case law to specialized works. (See Hume 1740, Book III, Section III, where he discusses the concepts that he believes underlie the rules of the profession, the limitation period, membership, and succession by which property may be acquired. He points out that it is not uncommon to reasonably claim that a rule of particular content is better than a rule of something else. Rather, it is important that there are legal regulations on this.) Legal rights are clearly rights that exist under the rules of legal systems or on the basis of decisions of the competent bodies assigned to them. They raise a number of different philosophical questions. (1) Whether legal rights are conceptually related to other types of rights, mainly moral rights; (2) What is the analysis of the concept of legal claims; (3) What types of companies may hold legal rights; (4) Whether there are types of rights that are exclusively subject to legal systems or that have at least much greater importance in legal systems, as opposed to morality; (5) What rights should legal systems create or recognize? Question (5) is first and foremost a question of moral and political philosophy and, in general, is no different from the question of what duties, authorizations, powers, etc. should create or recognize legal systems. It will therefore not be discussed here. Other rights may be conferred by normal law or by customary law (i.e.

the tradition of judicial law). An interesting point is that many legal rights are probably not conferred by a positive law, but simply result from the absence of a law to the contrary. That said, it is probably necessary for any legal system to have an unwritten “closure rule” stating that anything that is not prohibited is allowed. If some types of rights are essentially permissions, then many of those rights appear that way. In most jurisdictions, for example, my right to cross the street is of this kind. Probably no positive law will say that I can do it, and maybe no more general law will imply it. For many legal rights, a condition of their possession or exercise must be met. This in itself does not distinguish between legal rights and many moral rights. Just as you are only legally entitled to compensation for bodily harm if you have been attacked, you have a moral excuse to be insulted only if you have been insulted.

But legal rights can lead to more complicated situations that rarely occur in morality. There must be a sense in which legal systems can give rights to these institutions as they see fit. Because it has long been recognized that legal systems can consider these entities as legal entities as legal entities as they wish. In England, for example, “the crown” was considered a legal entity for centuries, although what this means in terms of incumbents changed much less for the actual people who held these positions during that period. Similarly, all modern societies recognize legal existence as persons of companies or corporations and often institutions such as trade unions, ministries, universities, certain types of partnerships and clubs, etc. Despite the usefulness of different classifications, each legal system has its own individual identity. The following are groups of legal systems classified according to their geographical location. Powers raise a different issue. Many writers (e.g., Hohfeld 1919, Hart 1973) regarded them as a kind of right.

By legal authority, we mean the ability to make changes to legal regulations or their application (plus other conditions). As a general rule, when granting a power, the legislator naturally also grants a right to exercise it, but this is sometimes not the case, for example, if the exercise of the right itself would constitute a crime or a civil injustice. In English law, for example, until the situation was recently changed by law, a thief had the legal authority, in certain special circumstances, to pass on good title to a third party over the property he had stolen, even if he had committed a civil and possibly criminal injustice. This seems to suggest that powers should not be considered rights themselves. Another particular type of legal claim, or group of rights that is increasingly respected by theorists, is the right to property. The discussion about this belongs more to that of the property itself – see the entry on the property. Only a few very brief points are raised here. The question here is whether there are fundamental aspects of rights that are exclusive or at least more important in legal systems, as opposed to morality. At the end of the case, Nicholls feels sorry for Harley and his lawyer.

He points out that the precedent now set means that ghosts in the state and across the United States now have the right to haunt haunted houses. After saying this, he simply disappears – he was a ghost himself. In this context, the immunities of the four basic types of rights that Hohfeld claimed to identify pose problems, albeit somewhat differently. Immunity arises when Y is not allowed to change X`s legal position. But is immunity itself a right, or is it simply a means of protecting a right, that is, by making it immune to elimination or change? As with the powers, the views on this are different.